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In the transition from civil war to civilian governance, how do newly elected leaders ensure the obedience of their military forces, especially when many members had previously fought against the government? What strategies do policymakers employ to ensure civilian control and prevent the renewal of conflict? And how do armed groups develop and maintain their power, even after the end of hostilities? In his new book, Strong Commanders, Weak States from Cornell University Press, published this past January, Schar School of Policy and Government assistant professor Philip Martin examines these questions through a case study of Côte d'Ivoire, which witnessed two civil wars from 2002 to 2007, and 2010 to 2011.
Martin first visited Côte d'Ivoire in 2015, intending to pursue a research question related to how the civil war affected democracy. However, he said, “What really struck me was how, in a series of interviews and conversations I had with journalists, government officials, and others, people would talk about the military situation and about how President Ouattara, who has been in charge of Côte d'Ivoire since 2011, has no love lost between him and several military figures.” As Martin learned, many of these military commanders have operations “parallel to or totally outside of the government, including business connections and irregular militias that still exist around the country.”
According to Martin, during periods of conflict, armed groups need to maintain the support of communities in areas they control. They do this by providing effective local government, focusing on public security and the protection of private property. Armed groups also often engage in limited provision of public goods, ensuring civilians under their control have access to a minimum standard of education and health care. All the while, armed groups are developing ties with existing elites with which they collaborate. Once the conflict subsides, Martin observes, these armed groups can parlay these links with local communities into an independent power base, giving them a degree of autonomy from the officially recognized civilian government.
This autonomy can contribute to continued political instability. International organizations such as the United Nations attempt to address this challenge by deploying peacekeeping missions. The missions provide training to security forces while hoping to instill in them a respect for civilian control and the chain of command. But according to Martin, these “technical” solutions ignore the underlying issue, i.e., the existence of independent bases of support that develop out of activities armed groups engaged in during the conflict.
Martin cautions against assuming this is always bad.
“We shouldn’t be too quick to confuse military loyalty with desired outcomes; having commanders who are loyal and obedient to the state is not always the best way to protect human rights and democracy,” he said. “We can look at cases like Rwanda or Zimbabwe, where there were civil wars followed by military construction and a lot of commander loyalty, but this ended up creating single-party governments.”
He adds, “I wouldn’t want people to read my book as some sort of manual for how to create an obedient military force, because that may or may not be a desirable thing.”
“All that said, if you want to limit the risk of mutiny or insubordination by field commanders, you could consider options for reducing the linkages between them and the territories they governed during the conflict,” said Martin.
One option would be to transfer commanders to areas of the country where they do not have strong ties or even to send them abroad to receive training. Doing so removes them from their base of support while also allowing their locally embedded networks to wither over time.
Alternatively, postconflict governments could support reintegration programs for ex-combatants. According to Martin, field commanders use their status in communities to connect ex-combatants with job opportunities or other types of economic support. Doing so strengthens their influence in the area and ensures the loyalty of former fighters that they might call upon in the future. Giving ex-combatants jobs, providing them with education, or helping them start a business can help them move into civilian life while also limiting their dependence on their former commanders.
Contemporary events highlight the relevance and importance of Martin’s research. Many countries today—Burma, Yemen, Sudan —are wracked by ongoing civil wars. Others, like Côte d’Ivoire, are still recovering. Late in 2024, the Syrian Civil War came to a surprising end when Bashar al-Assad fled the country amid the collapse of his military, bringing one of the 21st century’s bloodiest conflicts to a close. Indeed, Syria’s new government will likely face many of the challenges Martin identifies in Strong Commanders, Weak States. His research reminds us that the first step in addressing these challenges is understanding their root causes.